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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY-OIL PRICE FIXING BY MEMBER STATES OF
OPEC IS A GOVERNMENTAL ACT, NOT A COMMERCIAL ACT, AND THUS IS
EXEMPT FROM SUIT UNDER THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITITES ACT.
FOREIGN STATES AND U.S. ANTITRUST LAWS-FOREIGN
STATES CAN SUE, BUT CANNOT BE SUED UNDER AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAWS.
International Association of Machinists v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553
(C.D. Cal. 1979).
The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers, a labor union, filed suit in the United States District Court
for the District of California against the Organization of Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) and its thirteen member nations. The
plaintiff alleged that OPEC's price fixing of crude oil between 1973-
74 and 1978-79 violated American antitrust laws' and that these ille-
gal acts caused injury to the labor union through higher gasoline
prices at the pump. The district court dismissed the suit for money
damages and injunctive relief and held that: (1) the plaintiff was an
indirect purchaser of the defendants' product and thus was pre-
cluded from receiving damages under the Clayton Act;2 (2) the court
had no subject matter jurisdiction in this action because a nation's
efforts to control the allocation of its natural resources, whether
alone or in concert with other nations, is a governmental act which
merits immunity from suit under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act of 1976;1 (3) foreign nations can sue, but cannot be sued under
American antitrust laws; and (4) it was not shown either generally or
specifically that a direct causal link exists between the recent in-
creases in domestic gasoline prices and the increases in crude oil
prices charged by OPEC nations.
The court in this action had several reasons, each sufficient in
itself, for dismissing the complaint. Not only did the suit fail on ju-
risdictional and procedural grounds, but on the merits as well. The
complaint against OPEC was dismissed early in the proceedings be-
cause OPEC could not legally be served under either the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) or the International Organizations
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
2. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-29 (1976).
3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1976).
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Immunities Act (IOIA).' As the court pointed out, the FSIA only ap-
plies to nation states, which OPEC is not, and the IOIA only applies
to international organizations which include the United States as a
member, which is not the case with OPEC. The dismissal of the suit
against the individual member states of OPEC, however, merited
most of the court's attention and was based on procedural as well as
substantive grounds.
First, the court rejected the portion of the complaint that asked
for damages, because the plaintiff did not show that it had pur-
chased crude oil or gasoline directly from the defendants. Thus, the
plaintiff was considered to be as indirect purchaser. The court cited
the United States Supreme Court's holding in Illinois Brick Co. v.
Illinois' and ruled that a plaintiff in a price-fixing case is only able to
recover damages if it has purchased directly from the price fixer.
Accordingly, the labor union's prayer for damages was dismissed. The
fact that the plaintiff was an indirect purchaser did not, however,
preclude its ability to obtain injunctive relief against the defendants.
For this ruling, the court cited Mid-West Paper Products Co. v.
Continental Group, Inc.,' but admitted that whether an indirect
purchaser can obtain an injunction for an antitrust violation remains
an open question. What did preclude the requested injunction,
resulting in the dismissal of the remainder of the plaintiff's complaint,
was the defendants' ability to invoke sovereign immunity under the
FSIA, which deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1330(a).1
Under the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity as codified in
the FSIA, a foreign country can claim immunity from suits filed
against it in the United States if the act for which it is being sued
was a sovereign or governmental act. It cannot claim immunity for
acts based on "commercial activities."' Whether an act of a foreign
state is a commercial activity is to be determined by making reference
to the nature of the action, and not to its purpose.' In this case, the
4. 22 U.S.C. §§ 288a-288i (1976).
5. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
6. 596 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1979).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976) reads:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of any noninjury civil action against a foreign
state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief
in personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to
immunity either under sections 1605-1607 of this title or under any appli-
cable international agreement.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
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court considered the action in terms of the right of nations to control
their natural resources in accordance with the interests of their
national development and self-determination. Specifically, the court
cited General Assembly Resolution 1803 which declares the right to
permanent sovereignty over natural resources.' 0 In view of the fact
that the United States voted in favor of this resolution, and because
article IV of the United States Constitution supports the theory of
permanent sovereignty over natural resources," the court concluded
that "[tihe defendants' control over their oil resources is an espe-
cially sovereign function because oil, as their primary, if not sole,
revenue-producing resource, is crucial to the welfare of their nations'
peoples."'" Thus, because the defendants were able to invoke sover-
eign immunity under the FSIA, the court was deprived of subject
matter jurisdiction.
The plaintiffs suit was dealt another blow when the court held
that while foreign states can be plaintiffs in antitrust suits, they can-
not be made defendants. The authority for the rule that foreign
states can sue under the United States' antitrust laws came from a
recent Supreme Court decision, Pfizer, Inc. v. India."3 The court,
however, refused to extend Pfizer to the question of whether nations
can be made defendants. Instead, it followed a thin line of authority
provided by Hunt v. Mobile Oil Co.,' decided by the second circuit
in 1977, and Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo,
Inc.,15 decided by the federal district court in Delaware in 1970.
These cases reasoned that to allow foreign states to be sued under
the antitrust laws would "require judicial interference in sensitive
foreign policy matters."'" Thus, the court drew a parallel with the
10. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVIII), U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962). The rights of states to ex-
cercise full control over their resources in accordance with their national interests has
been reflected in numerous United Nations General Assembly resolutions. See, e.g.,
G.A. Res. 1515 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/4648 (1960); G.A. Res. 2158 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (1966). See generally, North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] I.C.J. 39 (in
which the International Court of Justice recognized the sovereign rights of nations to.
exploit their natural resources).
11. U.S. CoNs'r. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2, reads:
The Congress shall have the Power to dispose of and make all need-
ful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property be-
longing to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so
construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any
particular State.
12. 477 F. Supp. at 568.
13. 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
14. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
15. 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
16. 477 F. Supp. at 572.
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rule settled by the Supreme Court that domestic States may sue,17
but may not be sued, 8 under the antitrust laws.
Finally, as the coup de grace to the plaintiffs suit, the court
decided that the case also failed on its merits. In order for the plain-
tiff to have been able to obtain an injunction, it would have had to
show that the increases in gasoline prices paid by its members in
1973-74 and 1978-79 were the proximate result of OPEC price hikes
for crude oil during those years. The court ruled that because of the
number of intervening factors, it was not shown, either generally or
specifically, that the OPEC price hikes were the primary causes of
the dramatic rise in gasoline prices. Noting that shortages in refinery
capacity, an unexpected increase in gasoline consumption in 1978,
and the reduction of Iranian oil supplies had their share in contrib-
uting to higher gasoline prices in the United States, the court placed
most of the blame for the plaintiff's injury on the Department of
Energy. Elaborating on the harm rendered to domestic gasoline sup-
plies by government mismanagement, the court concluded that "as
soon as a crisis developed, both the Federal Department of Energy
and various State energy offices stepped in to turn a small shortage
into a large and horrendous shortage."1
The court in this case helped to clarify the standing of foreign
states vis-a-vis American antitrust laws. With the increasing pros-
pect of economic coercion by such organizations as OPEC, Interna-
tional Association of Machinists strengthens the principle that for-
eign states cannot be held to the antitrust standards contained in
the Sherman Act.
John A. Kenward
17. Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942).
18. Parker v. Brown 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
19. 477 F. Supp. at 574.
